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Using previously unanalyzed Japanese household data, this 
paper shows that the Japanese elderly's age-wealth profile is 
flat; the elderly are not dissaving. Part of the reason for 
the lack of dissaving appears to be the bequest motive, if it 
can be assumed that the intensity of the bequest motive is 
stronger if one has more surviving children. 
The conclusion that the Japanese elderly are not dissaving 
is based on estimates of the age-wealth profile from a sample 
of the independent elderly— those elderly who choose not to 
live with their children or other younger relatives. I 
perform a test of sample-selectivity bias and show that the 
age-wealth relation estimated from only the sample of the 
independent elderly is an unbiased estimate for all of the 
elderly. 
In performing this test of sample-selectivity bias, I find 
that self-employment and rural residential status increases 
the probability of the elderly's forming an intergenerational 
household. There is, however, no evidence of intensified 
competition among a larger number of children to adopt the 
parents, contradicting the hypothesis of Bernheim, Shleiffer, 
and Summers (1985). 
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1.Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the shape 
of the average Japanese elderly's age-wealth profile. 
Specifically, my paper examines whether the Japanese elderly 
are on average reducing their total wealth or keeping their 
total wealth intact, where total wealth is defined as the sum 
of financial wealth and wealth in real estate. The paper 
represents a possible improvement over earlier research in 
the following two ways* First, my estimates are conducted on 
previously unanalyzed household level cross-section data 
containing information on the elderly Japanese couple, 
including the couple's wealth holdings, social security 
benefits, earnings, and other demographic features. Earlier 
research have used either tabulated data (Kanamori, 1961) or 
household level data without specific information on the 
elderly couple (Ando, 1985). Since many of the Japanese 
elderly live with younger families, such data usually cannot 
distinguish between wealth belonging to the younger family 
and wealth belonging to only the elderly couple.1 Second, 
jointly with the elderly's age-wealth relation, I estimate by 
full-information maximum likelihood, the Japanese elderly's 
According to the 1980 Population Census of Japan, 56.7 
percent of those over 65 lived with a younger household. Of 
the elderly living in intergenerational households, 93.7 
percent were living with their married children. That is, in 
Japan, 53.1 percent (56.7*93.1) of the entire population of 
the over 65 live with their grown, married children. This is 
compared to 14 percent of the over 65 living with their 
children in the United States as of 198 0. 
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decision to join a younger family, to form an 
intergenerational household. The FIML procedure enables the 
estimates of the age-wealth equation to be corrected for 
sample-selectivity, and also allows the testing of certain 
hypotheses concerning the Japanese elderly's choice of living 
arrangement . 
Why is it important to assess the shape of the Japanese 
elderly!s age-wealth profile? By the early part of the next 
century, 21.3 percent of the Japanese population will be over 
the age of 65. Among Western industrialized countries, 
Japan will have the highest proportion of the aged. If the 
elderly on average reduce their wealth, then as the 
population ages, aggregate household saving should greatly 
fall. However, if the Japanese elderly are on average 
holding their wealth intact, then the rapid population aging 
should not by itself decrease the aggregate household saving 
rate by much.2 
The principal finding of this paper is that the average 
Japanese elderly's age-wealth profile is flat; the elderly 
are not dissaving. Part of the reason for the lack of 
dissaving appears to be the bequest motive, if it can be 
2The above argument is still "static" because bequests 
the elderly will ultimately leave will affect the saving of 
the currently young. The currently young may save less today 
in anticipation of the inheritance that they will receive 
later in life. Intuitively, this fall in the saving of the 
young may seem to offset the increase in saving of the old. 
However, if the young are smoothing out their consumption, 
the rise in current consumption in anticipation of the future 
windfall should not be substantial. 
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assumed that the intensity of the bequest motive is stronger 
if one has more surviving children. 
This paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 develops the model, and specifies the 
elderly's age-wealth and living arrangement choice equations 
that are to be jointly estimated in Section 4. Section 2 
also proposes a test to explore the nature of the bequest 
motive for the Japanese elderly. 
Section 3 briefly describes the data that serve as the 
basis for my estimations. Finally, Section 4 depicts and 
analyzes the results. 
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2.Specification of Equations 
2.1 Specification of the Japanese elderly's age-wealth 
equation 
Following Mirer (1979), King and Dicks-Mireaux(1982), 
Menchik and David (1985), Ando (1985), Hubbard (1986), and 
Hurd (1987), I estimate a linearized version of the elderly's 
age-wealth profile. To test whether the elderly reduce their 
total wealth, it is sufficient to see whether total wealth 
declines as the elderly household head moves into 
progressively higher age brackets, other factors suitably 
held constant. The equation to be estimated is the following: 
W(t)/LTW= SL1 + bxAGEl + cxAGE2 + d1SSW(t)/LTW + e^CITY + 
fxMCITY + gxSELF + u1 (1) 
where 
W(t): total tangible wealth of the elderly couple when 
the head is aged t, the sum of financial assets and 
real estate assets. 
SSW(t)t social security wealth of the elderly couple, 
the present value of social security benefits 
discounted to the present age of the head. 
LTW: lifetime wealth, the present value of the 
couple's inheritance, after-tax earnings, and social 
security benefits discounted to age 20 of the head. 
AGE1: dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
the head is aged 65-69 and otherwise zero. 
AGE2: dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
the head is aged 70-74 and otherwise zero. 
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LCITY,MCITYs dummy variables that take on values of 
one if the elderly couple lives in a large or medium-
sized city. 
SELF: a dummy variable that is one if the head is 
self-employed. 
al' bl' cl' dl' el' fl' 9l a r e parameters to be 
estimated, u^ is a normally distributed random variable with 
mean 0 and variance sigma-squared. The excluded category for 
the age dummy variables is when the head is aged 60-64. The 
excluded category for the city-size dummies is when the 
elderly couple lives in a rural area. If social security 
wealth is perfectly substitutable for total wealth, then di_ 
should equal negative one (Feldstein, 1974). It is assumed 
that the disturbance term, u^ arises out of omitted variables 
and approximation error uncorrelated with the regressors.1 
The estimation of Eg. (1) should be interpreted as 
performing an analysis of covariance with three (age) 
•^ The specification of Eq. (1) may seem ad hoc, since it 
is not precisely derived from lifetime utility maximization. 
If the objective of the research is to estimate the 
parameters of the underlying lifetime utility function and 
budget constraint, then the specification of Eq. (1) is 
unsatisfactory. The coefficient estimates of Eq. (1) will be 
some highly non-linear combination of the preference 
parameters, life-expectancies, and the after-tax real 
interest rate, and recovery of these structural parameters 
will be difficult. However, if the objective of the research 
is to simply observe if the elderly are dissaving, then it 
is not necessary to estimate the underlying parameters. 
Assuming that the after-tax real interest rate, life 
expectancies, and underlying preference parameters are time-
stationary, the coefficient estimates of Eq. (1) will be 
consistent in the future. The age-wealth profile estimated 
for today's elderly can be applied to the elderly of 
tomorrow. 
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categories without interactions.2 The null hypothesis is 
that as the age cohort of the head increases, there is no 
dissaving from total wealth. That is, 
H(0) : *>! = C! = 0, 
and the alternative hypothesis is that dissaving occurs, 
H(l): b^ less than 0 or c^ less than 0. 
The specification of Eq. (1) helps solve the "cohort 
bias" arising from using cross-section age-wealth profiles to 
approximate longitudinal age-wealth profiles. To test for 
the hypothesis of no old age dissaving, we need to observe 
longitudinal changes in a person's wealth. Saving is W(t)-
W(t-l) where both W(t) and W(t-l) refer to the wealth 
holdings of the same individual. Observing people of 
different ages in a cross-section is not the same as 
following an individual over time. On average, because of 
technical progress and capital accumulation, the older 
members of a cross-section will have worked during periods of 
lower real wages. Hence, everything else including education 
being equal, the older persons can be expected to hold less 
2Hurd (1987) performs a similar ANOCOVA by testing how 
flow financial saving varies among different age groups, and 
finds evidence that the elderly dissave from financial 
wealth. He does not report results for what the elderly do 
to their total wealth, which includes real estate holdings. 
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wealth. For cross-section profiles to approximate 
longitudinal profiles, some adjustment for interpersonal 
differences in lifetime wealth is needed. Equation (1) 
performs this adjustment by dividing the elderly couple's 
W(t) and SSW(t) by the couple's lifetime wealth. The 
footnote below explains why this adjustment is appropriate 
when both annual consumption and bequests are proportional to 
lifetime wealth.3 
The city-size dummies, LCITY, MCITY are included to 
capture cost of living differences among the regions. In 
regions where the cost of living is high, the elderly would 
need to hold more wealth to finance their old age 
consumption. 
The dummy SELF is added to distinguish the self-
3If an additively-separable Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution lifetime utility function is maximized subject 
to the lifetime wealth constraint, the optimal levels of 
annual consumption and bequests will be proportional to 
lifetime wealth. Since optimal total wealth at each age 
including the present value of future earnings and social 
security receipts is a linear combination of desired future 
consumption and bequests, optimal total wealth holdings will 
also be proportional to lifetime wealth, where the constant 
of proportionality is some complicated function of age. For 
the elderly, the present value of future earnings is of 
secondary importance. Therefore, the ratio of total wealth 
to lifetime wealth is equal to the sum of the constant of 
proportionality and the ratio of social security wealth to 
lifetime wealth. Holding the ratio of social security wealth 
to lifetime wealth constant, the total wealth/lifetime wealth 
ratio changes only when the constant of proportionality 
changes; the constant of proportionality changes when the 
household head ages. Hence, the current wealth/lifetime 
wealth profile depends only on age. 
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employed elderly from the elderly who are employed or 
retired. The retired elderly are assumed to have been 
workers before they faced retirement. As explained in 
Section 3, LTW is approximated using tabulated data called 
the Basic Survey on the Wage Structure, (Chingin Kozo Kihon 
Chosa). The survey covers only worker households, and the 
LTW calculated for workers is simply imputed to the self-
employed. If the LTW of the elderly self-employed is 
systematically underapproximated by this imputation 
procedure, then it is necessary to distinguish the self-
employed elderly from the other elderly, at least by an 
intercept shift in the measured level of the life-cycle 
W(t)/LTW ratio. 
2.2 Specification of the elderly8s living arrangement 
equation 
In Section 4, Eq. (1) is estimated first for the entire 
sample of couples over 60. In Japan, there are two types of 
elderly households; the intergenerational and the 
independent. For the elderly who choose to form an 
intergenerational household, the age-wealth profile observed 
in the data may not reflect their "true" saving behavior. 
When Japanese parents join a younger family, the parents 
bring with them, their assets. According to Japanese social 
convention, once the parents join, they will bequeath almost 
their entire net assets to the child or to another younger 
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generation member who takes care of them.4 
When the parents live with the younger household, they 
will often impose substantial costs on the younger family, 
costs such as increased food spending, expenses for gas, 
electricity, medicine, and nursing care. These imposed costs 
should be counted as part of the parents' consumption, 
decreasing the parents' wealth holdings. If these imposed 
costs are not added to the consumption of the elderly living 
in intergenerational households, the resulting "net wealth 
measurement bias" will mean that there is less of a chance 
that the null hypothesis of no dissaving will be rejected. 
Restricting the sample to the independent elderly, however, 
will lead to sample selection bias, if the independent 
elderly are not a random sample of the entire elderly 
population. The coefficients of the wealth equation 
estimated from only the sample of the independent elderly may 
then not be applicable to the entire population of the 
elderly. 
4In the 1979 Prime Minister's Office's Opinion Survey on 
Inheritance, 78.3 percent of the elderly said that they will 
leave all of their bequest to the child who took care of 
them. Only 12.1 percent said that their bequest should be 
eqully divided among their children. By Japanese Civil Law, 
the elderly cannot give their entire net bequest to any one 
child. Half of the estate must be equally divided among the 
heirs. However, the intergenerational elderly still has 
control over who receives the bulk of the bequest. Suppose 
the aged individual has three children. He can legally give 
any one child up to 67 percent of the entire estate (.50 + 
.333*.50). In practice, most young families who look after 
the aged receive a higher fraction of the inheritance, since 
there is rarely litigation over the division of the estate. 
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The standard procedure to correct for this form of 
selection bias would be to posit a self-selection equation 
and estimate the self-selection equation and Eq. (1) jointly 
by maximum likelihood (Heckman, 1979, Maddala, 1983). The 
result will give us unbiased estimates of the coefficients 
and of their standard errors. 
The self-selection equation is given below: 
V(ind) - V(dep)= a2 + b2LTW + c2PDVO + d2SSK + e2SELF + (2) 
f2LCITY + g2MCITY + h2OCHIL + k2MCHIL - u2 
NXNTER= 1 if and only if V(ind) - V(dep) greater than zero. 
where a2, b2, c2, d2, e2/ f2/ g2, h2/ and k2 are parameters 
to be estimated. For theoretical tractability, it is assumed 
that all parents join the younger household when the head 
reaches the age of 60 , if they are ever to join.5 Thus, 
V(ind) and V(dep) are latent variables describing the rest-
5Since I only have cross-section data, the proper 
interpretation of the age-wealth profile becomes difficult if 
parents can join at different ages. For example, the wealth 
level of a 65 year old who plans to join next year is 
different from last year's wealth level of today's 
independent 66 year old. Previous empirical studies of the 
U.S. elderly suggest that age does not affect the probability 
of forming an intergenerational household once the head is 
past 60 (Swartz, Danzinger, and Smolensky, 1984, Ando and 
Kennickell, 1986). Also, exploratory probits on my working 
sample of the elderly have led to insignificant coefficients 
on "Age" when it is included as an explanatory variable. 
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of-life indirect utilities at age 60 of living independently 
and living in an intergenerational household. NINTER is a 
dummy indicator variable that becomes one if V(ind) is 
greater than V(dep), and u2, the error term, includes the 
unobservables. That is, NINTER becomes one only if the 
elderly couple is independent.6 
The difference in indirect utilities between living 
alone and living in an intergenerational household is 
assumed to depend on the following explanatory variables: 
lifetime wealth of the couple (LTW), post-mandantory 
retirement (post-age 60) after-tax earnings (PDVO), the 
present discounted value of social security benefits from 
when the head is aged 60 to when his spouse dies (SSK), dummy 
variables representing the size of the city in which the 
elderly couple resides (LCITY, MCITY), and dummy variables 
that take on values of one if the elderly head is self-
6NINTER becomes one only if the elderly decide to form 
an intergenerational household and also if at least one 
younger family opts to live with the parents. The outcome of 
NINTER2* 1 is a result of two separate decisons, one by the 
elderly and another by the younger families. Ideally, the 
Japanese elderly's living arrangement choice should be 
modelled as two separate structural equations, incorporating 
the decisions of the elderly and of the younger families. 
Unfortunately in my data, little information on the 
characteristics of the children and other younger relatives 
is available to separately identify the two equations. Given 
the absence of identifying restrictions, Eq. (2) should be 
interpreted as a reduced form for the Japanese elderly's 
living arrangement. In the ensuing discussion in the text, 
it is implicit that Eq. (1) is a reduced form, since 
exogenous variables like LCITY and MCITY are assumed to 
affect the choices of both the elderly and the younger 
families. 
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employed (SELF), if the elderly couple has exactly one child 
(OCHIL), and if the elderly couple has more than one child 
(MCHIL). The rationale for the inclusion of these variables 
is given below. 
Swartz, Danzinger, and Smolensky (1984) suggest that 
unconstrained by income, the elderly will prefer to be 
independent. The state of "living in an intergenerational 
family" is an inferior good. A rise in earnings, social 
security benefits, and wealth would imply that the elderly 
are more likely to realize their goal of maintaining 
independent households. In my model, the elderly make the 
decision to join at age 60. The elderly couple's economic 
position when the head is aged 60 is summarized by the sum. 
of their total tangible wealth, the present value of their 
future earnings, and the present value of their social 
security receipts, i.e. A(60)+PDVO+SSK. For the elderly 
currently over 60, total tangible wealth when they were 
actually aged 60 is unobservable. It is plausible to 
assume, however, that holding PDVO and SSK constant, a change 
in W(60) will be proportional to a change in LTW.7 LTW is 
therefore included as an instrument for W(60). If living 
'It was argued in an earlier footnote that if both 
desired consumption and bequests are proportional to lifetime 
wealth, then optimal total wealth holdings will also be 
proportional to lifetime wealth, where the constant of 
proportionality is a complicated function of age. For people 
of the same age, the constant of proportionality will be 
identical. 
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alone is preferred to joining, then a rise in PDVO, SSK, or 
LTW should raise the probability of maintaining an 
independent household, and the coefficients of these 
variables in Eq. (2) should be positive. 
The locational variables, LCITY and MCITY are included 
because they may affect how the younger family treates the 
parents once the parents decide to live with the younger 
family. We would expect that in isolated rural areas where 
traditional social mores persist, the parents will be 
offered a better deal upon joining. In Japanese rural areas, 
there are often heavy pressures imposed on the younger family 
to take care of the parents.8 
The dummy variable SELF is included since the self-
employed may have additional reasons for living with the 
younger generation. The coefficient on SELF should be 
negative, since it is not unusual for children or nieces and 
nephews who live with the self-employed elderly to assist in 
the operation of the family farm or the family business 
without remuneration. Such assistance, of great value to the 
self-employed elderly, is usually not available to those who 
are company employees or who are retired. 
8Fukutake (1981, pp.34-43), Vogel (1967) among others 
claim that a strong ie ethos still prevails in rural areas 
where the sen, whether the oldest or not, inherits the home 
and the family name. When the family has only daughters, 
then one of the daughters will marry and make her husband 
adopt her last name. The objective is to keep the family 
name from disappearing. Fukutake says that in urban areas, 
the ie tradition started to crumble even before the Second 
World War. 
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It is possible that even in the absence of surviving 
children, the elderly may live with a member of the younger 
generation. The elderly, however, may be more reluctant to 
live with nieces and nephews than with their own children. 
If OCHIL decreases the probability that the elderly will be 
independent, then the Japanese aged are more likely to form 
an intergenerational household with their children than with 
other younger relatives. 
Also, Bernheim, Shleiffer, and Summers (1985) have 
argued that parents have more leverage over a given child if 
the parents have more than one child. If the parents have 
only one child, then the only child can almost be certain 
that no matter how poorly he treats his parents, he will be 
able to receive his parents1 bequest. His parents have only 
one credible beneficiary, the only child. However, if the 
parents have several children, the children will compete with 
each other for the favor of the parents in order to receive 
the bulk of the estate. An implication of the above 
hypothesis is that MCHIL should have a stronger negative 
impact than OCHIL on the elderly's choice of independence. 
In my estimation, NINTER^ 0 only if the parents are 
living with a married child or with another younger family. 
To include those living with unmarried children may create a 
problem because unmarried children are usually still 
dependents. In my working sample of the 3 35 elderly, 115 
live with married children and 97 live with unmarried 
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children. The elderly are counted as living with a younger 
household only if the head of the younger household is 
reported as being the head of the entire intergenerational 
family. 
The unobservable variables may include subjective 
elderly couple-specific variables such as the psychological 
compatibility between the elderly couple and the younger 
families. Since some of the unobservables in Eq. (1) and Eq. 
(2) are likely to be the same, u^ and U2 are possibly 
correlated. Unless corrected, this correlation will lead to 
biased coefficient estimates of Eq. (1) if the equation is 
estimated on only the sub-sample of the independent elderly. 
By estimating Eq. (1) jointly with Eq. (2) by maximum 
likelihood methods, we can obtain consistent and efficient 
estimates of the coefficients and of the coefficient standard 
errors.9 It is assumed that u^ and u2 are bivariately 
normally distributed. The algorithm used to obtain the 
maximum of the likelihood function is that of the Davidson-
9The likelihood function to be maximized is given below. 
For notational convenience, let NI= NINTER, X and B be the 
exogenous variables and parameters of Eq. (1) and Z and D be 
the exogenous variables and parameters of Eq. (2) . U]_ and 
u2 are the error terms. NI(j) = 1 if the jth household is 
independent. The likelihood function is given by: 
L= 3n5
 j=1
 ( f ( u i ^ ' D f(uilu2)du2)NI^ M I - F ( Z ' D ) , 1 - S I ^ 
where f (UT_) is the unconditional normal density function for 
ul' f(ullu2) ^s t h e conditional normal density of UT_ given 
u2, and F(Z'D) is the unit normal distribution evaluated at 
Z'D. Because only the sign of NI(j) is observed, the 
standard deviation of u2 is normalized to equal unity. 
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Fletcher-Powell. 
2.3 Specification for a test of the bequest motive 
The shape of the age-wealth profile may not be 
informative about the strength of the bequest motive. As 
noted by Davies (1981), Hubbard (1986), and Hurd (1987), the 
elderly may not reduce their wealth if they fear unexpected 
emergencies or living an unexpectedly long life. The 
precautionary motive for saving against medical emergencies 
seems to be prevalent among the Japanese aged. A 1983 Bank 
of Japan household survey reported that 82 percent of people 
over the age of 60 reply that they save as a precaution 
against high future medical expenses. 
It is reasonable to assume that the intensity of 
bequests is some positive function of the number of children, 
NCHIL.10 An increase in the number of children should 
increase wealth held at each age, other things equal. Of 
course, children are not costless. Childrearing imposes a 
resource cost on parents which may be substantial, including 
expenses such as education. While these resource costs of 
children will tend to lower parent wealth holdings, the 
bequest effect will tend to raise wealth. 
To explore the nature of the bequest motive, the number 
10It is a common practice in the empirical public 
finance literature to use the number of children as an 
instrument for the intensity of the bequest motive. See 
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1983), Tomes (1981), Hurd(1986). 
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of children who are still alive, NCHIL, is added to Eq. (1) 
in several estimations. If the bequest effect dominates the 
resource cost effect, then we would expect the coefficient 
on NCHIL to be positive and statistically significant for 
the independent elderly. As mentioned, for the 
intererenerational elderly, the bulk of the bequest will go 
to the younger family who takes care of the elderly couple. 
For the intergenerational elderly, total bequests should not 
be a monotonically increasing function of the number of 
children. If NCHIL increases wealth holdings for the 
independent elderly population, then the bequest motive 
exists. -11 
i:LThe above test of a bequest motive is valid only if 
the number of children, fertility, can be treated as 
exogenous. To test for exogeneity, I use the procedure 
recommended by Hausman (1978) on the sample of the 
independent elderly. Specifically, I first run ordinary 
least squares on Eq. (1) plus NCHIL. Next my estimates are 
based on a two-stage least squares procedure where the first 
stage is a regression of the variable hypothesized to be 
endogenous, NCHIL, on the instruments. The instruments are 
the exogenous regressors of Eq. (1), and another variable 
thought to influence completed fertility, the education level 
of the wife. Under the null hypothesis of exogeneity of 
NCHIL, ordinary least squares is consistent and efficient. 
Two-stage least squares is consistent for both the null and 
the alternative hypotheses, where NCHIL is endogenous and 
adequately identified by the wife's education. Using OLS and 
2SLS parameter and variance-covariance matrix estimates, I 
calculate the Hausman F statistic which is asymptotically 
distributed Chi-squared with four degrees of freedom. The 
value of the Chi-squared statistic is only .543 so the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the ten percent level. 
Consequently in my estimation of Eq. (1), the number of 
children is treated as an exogenous regressor. 
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3.Description of the Data and Construction of the Variables 
3.1 Description of the Data 
The household survey is called the Survey on the 
Living Behavior of the Aged (Rojin Ishiki Chosa, LBC data for 
short) and was conducted in October 1983 by Tokyo 
University's Sociology Department on behalf of the Japanese 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. To my knowledge, 
this survey has never been previously used in analyzing 
Japanese household saving. 
Since my objective is to study the wealth accumulation 
behavior of the elderly, the sample is restricted to those 
over the age of 60e1 Of the 737 people aged between 60-74, 
1There are two reasons for not starting my working 
sample at, say age 55. First in Japan, there is a system of 
mandantory retirement from the primary job, usually between 
the ages of 55 and 60. At the time of retirement, a large 
lump-sum payment is made to the retiree, and in 1983, these 
payments were 1.75 times the average Japanese household pre-
tax income. The problem is that for the 55-60 age group, 
some people will have received the lump-sum payments, others 
will not have. For a person who has still not retired, 
reported total wealth will be a downward biased measure of 
the person's true net worth. 
Second, some people under 60 may have large outstanding 
liabilities such as outstanding housing loans. These large 
liabilities are a result of the very high cost of housing in 
Japan. It is customary that these loans are paid off in full 
with the lump-sum retirement pension. The LBC data 
unfortunately do not provide information on outstanding 
liabilities. The total wealth reported in the survey is 
assumed to approximately measure net wealth, and this 
approximation should be improved by restricting the sample to 
persons over 60. 
The non-reporting of liabilities, however, should not 
seriously bias reported total wealth for those over 60. The 
1984 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 
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507 reported both their financial and real wealth holdings. 
I assume that non-reporting is randomly distributed in the 
population. 
The 507 observations are further sub-divided by 
deleting 37 corporate executives, 115 widows, 18 couples with 
the wife older than the husband or with the husband more than 
II years older than the wife, and 2 households in which the 
head earns over 15 million yen and is "retired" or self-
employed.2 With the above criteria to define the working 
(Zenkoku Shihi Jitai Chosa) classifies liabilites by age and 
income groups. The survey shows a 63 percent decline in 
outstanding liabilities from the 50-59 age group to the 60-69 
age group. For all income brackets in the 60-69 age group, 
liabilities are less than 10 percent of gross financial 
wealth. Liabilities must therefore be a much smaller 
fraction of total wealth, which includes equity in housing. 
The ratio of liabilities to gross financial wealth also 
remains fairly constant across age groups; it tends to remain 
stable across the 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over groups. 
Because of the small magnitudes of outstanding liabilities 
for the Japanese elderly, I treat the non-reporting of 
liabilities as an error in measurement of the dependent 
variable, total tangible wealth. The ratio of the error, 
non-reported liabilities, to lifetime wealth is assumed to be 
independently and normally distributed across elderly 
couples. The non-reporting error can therefore be subsumed 
in the general error term, u^ in Eq. (1). 
2Corporate executives are deleted because they are more 
likely to own private side-businesses, the value of which is 
not adequately captured in the wealth variable of the LBC 
survey. Widows are deleted, because we cannot know the 
deceased husband's birthdate or other characteristics needed 
to calculate lifetime wealth and index the husband's birth 
cohort. 
Since an underlying assumption of Eq. (1) is that the 
difference in age between the wife and the husband is similar 
for all couples in the cross-section, including couples with 
the husband much older than the wife or with the wife older 
than the husband will violate the assumption. Finally, high 
income retired or self-employed households probably own 
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sample, I am left with 3 35 couples with the head aged between 
60 and 74. 
Next I will describe how the variables used in the 
estimation are constructed. The reader interested in only 
the econometric results can skip to Section 4. 
3.2 Construction of the Variables 
SSW(t), LTW, PDVO and SSK are simulated variables or 
variables not observed in the LBC, but constructed from the 
LBC and other sources. For consistency with the values 
reported in the 1983 LBC survey, all simulated variables are 
in real 1983 yen. The Consumer Price Index was used to 
deflate the nominal magnitudes. In the construction of some 
of the simulated variables, annual real income flows had to 
be discounted or capitalized at a real rate of return. 
Following Hayashi (1986) and Ando (1985), I use a constant 
real rate of interest of four percent. 
It is assumed that the husband starts work at age 20 
and faces mandantory retirement from the primary job at age 
60 or age M, although he may continue to work in another job 
after age 60.3 Also, the elderly couple is assumed to 
"exist" until the last remaining spouse, usually the wife, 
dies. Hence, the upper value of all the summations is age T, 
the age the husband would have been had he lived until the 
time of death of his wife. For example, if the husband is 5 
years older than the wife, and the wife is expected to die at 
age 78, T would be 83, though he might have expected to live 
only to age 76. 
3.2.1 Present value of social security benefits, SSW(t) 
The expression for social security wealth is given by, 
SSW(t) = ;£i=Et ss(i)/(l+r)i"t 
substantial income generating business assets in addition to 
what is declared in the LBC survey. 
3In Japan, there is widespread practice of forced 
retirement from the primary job. The practice usually 
applies to all non-executives in a company. Traditionally 
the age of mandantory retirement has been 55, but now the age 
has moved closer to 60. 
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where ss(i) is the sum of social benefits for the 
husband and for the wife. The summation starts from M, which 
is the age of mandantory retirement in Japan. 
A distinctive feature of my calculation of social 
security wealth for people over 65 is that actual 
observations of social security receipts are used. Previous 
work, Kotlikoff (1979), King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), and 
Ando (1985) calculate social security wealth indirectly 
assuming actuarial fairness. Noguchi (1983) and Takayama 
(1981) argue that for current Japanese beneficiaries, the 
assumption of actuarial fairness is invalid, since the 
present value of benefits exceeds the present value of 
contributions. 
Two major schemes comprise the Japanese social security 
system, the Employees' Pension (Kosei Nenkin) and the 
Citizen's Annuity Program (Kokumin Nenkin).4 Men can belong 
to either the Employees' Pension or to the Citizens' Annuity 
Program, but I assume that all housewives belong to the 
Citizen's Annuity Program. 
For men and women over 65, the survey reports annual 
social security benefits. The present discounted value of 
social security benefits of an individual is simply the 
discounted sum of yearly benefits from his age at the time of 
the survey until his expected age of death.5 Future yearly 
benefits are assumed to remain at the 1983 level in real 
value. 
Citizen's annuity benefits are not received prior to 
age 65. For recipients of the Employees' Pension who are 
under 65, an earnings test applies. For example, if a person 
earns between 45 and 92 thousand yen a month, monthly 
benefits are reduced by 20 percent. If he earns over 150 
thousand yen, monthly benefits are completely cut. To impute 
annual Employees' Pension benefits to people under 65, it is 
assumed that people who are working at age t less than 65 
will continue to work at the same level of earnings until age 
65. Therefore, a person's Employees' Pension benefits remain 
at the partial level until he reaches 65 at which time his 
benefits jump to the full level. The full level is 
determined by dividing the partially received amount by 1-k 
4There is another scheme that covers only employees of 
public institutions. The role of the Kvosai Nenkin is 
relatively minor, since people enrolled in the program are 
few compared to the enrollees in the two major schemes. 
5The expected ages of death for the wife and the husband 
are taken from the 1980 Japanese Acturarial Life Tables. 
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where k is the fraction by which benefits are reduced for 
pre-age 65 people. 
For people under 65 and earning more than 150 thousand 
yen a month, social security benefits are completely 
eliminated. Social security wealth consists of only 
benefits to be received after reaching the age of 65. What 
these people will receive upon reaching the age of 65 is 
unobserved. Benefits from the Employees' Pension depend on a 
term in the statutory benefits formula called the "average 
monthly regular earnings" (hyojun hoshu getsugaku). Average 
monthly earnings during a person's career are highly related 
to the person's education. Annual benefits to be received 
past the age of 65 are imputed in the following way. As a 
group for men currently aged 65, 66, and 67, and receiving 
the full amount of Employees' Pension benefits, average 
yearly pension benefits by education level are calculated 
from the LBC data. These yearly benefits are what a person 
under 65 and earning over 150 thousand yen today can expect 
to receive upon reaching 65. For example, a person with a 
high school education will form an expectation of future 
pension benefits by observing the pension receipts of current 
65, 66, and 67 year olds similar to himself. The calculated 
average Employees' Pension benefits of 65, 66, and 67 year 
olds are then simply imputed to those under 65 in identical 
education groups, under the assumption that the real level of 
1983 benefits will be maintained in the future. 
For housewives and men enrolled in the Citizen's 
Annuity program, benefits to be received when they reach the 
age of 65 are approximated in the same way as that for men 
under 65 enrolled in the Employees' Pension program. The 
magnitude of Citizens' Annuity benefits is determined not by 
the lifetime average level of earnings, but by the number of 
quarters a person has contributed into the system. Education 
is not an instrument for the average lifetime wage, but for 
the number of periods a person has contributed. A housewife 
with more education, for example, may be more conscientious 
about making payments on her Citizens' Annuity plan. 
3.2.2 Lifetime Wealth, LTW 
The expression for lifetime wealth is given by, 
LTW= I + Z M i = 2 0 y ( i ) / d + r ) i " 2 0 +£ T i -M y C i J / C l + r ) 1 " 2 0 + 
LTE i f l PDVO* 
£ T i - M s s C D / d + r ) 1 " 2 0 
SSK* 
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For the Japanese elderly, it is assumed that 
inheritances, I, are equal to zero. This is reasonable, given 
that people who are elderly in 1983 probably received their 
inheritances before World War II and the rapid postwar 
inflation between 1956 and 1959. 
There are two parts to the present discounted value of 
incomeJ after- tax earnings before the age of mandantory 
retirement and after-tax income after forced retirement. The 
latter is the sum of PDVO* and SSK*.6 Because it is assumed 
that people face mandantory retirement at age 60, PDVO* and 
SSK* can be estimated from my LBC working sample.7 LTE must 
be approximated from other sources. 
Using published tabulated data, LTE is approximated by 
running repeated cross-section regressions from 1929 to 1982. 
The data, called the Basic Survey on the Wage Structure, is 
published by the Ministry of Labor.8 Earnings are assumed to 
be determined by the employees' age and education level. The 
squared form of age is also included to account for the 
quadratic nature of the age-earnings profile. 
The actual estimations of the functions are based on 
five-year intervals in age, i.e. 22, 27, 32, 37, etc. From 
the estimated earnings function, I can obtain predicted 
earnings in a given year for every age and education class 
from 1929 to 1982. Since these predicted earnings are 
available for each year, it is feasible to continuously 
estimate predicted earnings for a particular birth cohort of 
bPDVO* and SSK* here are asterisked to distinguish them 
from PDVO and SSK appearing in equation 2 of Section 2. 
PDVO and SSK are discounted to age 60 of the head, while 
PDVO* and SSK* ^re discounted to age 2$.of the head. That 
is, PDVO= (1+r) PDVO* and SSK= (1+r) SSK*. 
7Both LTE and PDVO* are calculated for only the husband. 
This is necessitated in part because it is impossible to 
estimate the longitudinal labor force participation behavior 
for each wife in my sample. 
8The Wage Survey is very incomplete before 1953. 
Annual wages for each age and education category before 1953 
had to be imputed by the following method. Nakayama (1977) 
has painstakingly calculated nominal wages in the pre-war and 
immediate postwar periods (his Table I, "olumn L). However, 
he does not allocate earnings by different age and education 
groups. Allocation into different age groups is done using 
Kitayama (1979). The allocation of wages in a given age 
group by education class is done using the 1954 Wage Survey, 
the earliest year an allocation by education class was 
performed. 
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a given educational class as it ages from 20 to 59. For 
example, a 74 year-old college graduate in 1983 was 59 in 
1968, 45 in 1954, 20 in 1929. Predicted earnings for this 
individual when he was aged 45 can be approximated by 
substituting "45" for age and "1" for the college dummy in 
the earnings function of 1954. Predicted earnings when aged 
4 6 can be approximated from the earnings function of 1955 and 
so on. These simulations are performed for everyone aged 
between 60 and 74 in 1983 and for each educational category. 
To arrive at the after-tax figure, the annual average 
social security contributions and income taxes paid by each 
earnings category are deducted from the earnings predicted by 
the above procedure. Average social security contributions 
and income taxes categorized by the level of earnings are 
available from various annual editions of the Family Income 
and Expenditure Survey, published by the Prime Minister's 
Office. 
Table A-l in the Appendix to this paper reports in 
detail the gross and net of tax LTEs for each birth cohort 
and education class. 
To complete the calculation of LTW, PDVO* and SSK* must 
be approximated. To calculate PDVO*, a forecast of the 
expected retirement path for Japanese males over 60 is 
needed. Using the LBC, a simple cross-section probit of the 
head's employment status is run on the following variables: 
head's age, the residential location dummies, the social 
security scheme the head is enrolled-in, self-employment 
status, and the head's educational level. Table A-2 in the 
Appendix reports the estimation results. The predicted 
values of retirement are obtained by varying the head's age 
from 60 to 70 while holding his other, permanent 
characteristics constant.9 
From the LBC, I can calculate average after-tax 
earnings for each education category and age between 60 and 
70. If y(h,i) is the average after-tax labor income of an i 
year-old of education category h in 1983, then the PDVO* of a 
male aged t in 1983 is given by: 
PDVO*=^is=Mpiy(h,i)/(l+r)t 
where p^ is the probability of work at age i. As in Ando 
(1985), the formula above assumes that the annual real rate 
9It is assumed that the head completely retires at age 
70. Very few people in my sample work after age 70, and it 
is difficult to obtain accurate average earnings figures for 
this group. 
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of growth of earnings for the elderly is constant for all age 
and education groups, and is equal to the real interest 
rate.10 
To calculate SSK*, the discounted value of benefits 
between the ages of 60 and t is needed.11 For husbands and 
wives currently over 65, it is assumed that a constant level 
of real benefits equal to the current level was received from 
65 to the current age. For husbands enrolled in the 
Employees' Pension Plan, the approximation of pre-age 65 
benefits is complicated. First, for men who are 64, 63, and 
62 in 1983, average yearly pension benefits are classified by 
education levels using the LBC. These benefits are then 
imputed to those over 65 in education classes identical to 
those under 65. 
For husbands currently below age 65, it is assumed that 
the present level of real benefits was received throughout 
the age interval t-60. If the current level of benefits is 
zero, the husband is assumed to have not received any past 
benefits. 
10For a person of age.t in 1983, earnings when aged i 
are given by y(h,i)(1+g) ~ ,where g is the real growth rate 
of earnings. Discounting the expression by (1+r)1, summing 
from M to 70, and setting r=g, gives the expression in the text 
11Annual social security receipts between the ages of t 
and T were approximated earlier in 3.2.1. 
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4. Results 
Table 1 summarizes and defines the variables that are 
used in my estimation. The cohort means of some of the 
variables are classified by age and education in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that average total wealth rises as the age 
group of the household head increases. Can we conclude from 
the Table that the Japanese elderly are not dissaving? Such 
a conclusion is still premature, since there is the bias 
caused by the large number of the elderly living with the 
younger generation. However, estimates of the selectivity-
corrected Eg. 1 show that even when this "net wealth 
measurement bias" is controlled, there is still no evidence 
that the Japanese elderly dissave from their total wealth. 
Table 3 reports the least-squares estimates of Eq. (1) 
and Eq. (1) with NCHIL added as an additional exogenous 
variable. The equations are estimated on the complete sample 
of the elderly, including the elderly living in 
intergenerational households. Both equations were first 
estimated by ordinary least squares. Because of the high 
values of the Breusch and Pagan (1979) Chi-squared statistic, 
the estimates presented in Table 1 are corrected for 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity by a method proposed by White 
(1980). 
From the first column, we can see that as the age group 
Table 1 
Definition of Variables and Saaple Statistics 
Mean S.D. 
WCt)/LTfe: Total Tangible Wealth divided by Lifetime .855 1.14 
Weath. 
L7W" Lifetiae Wealth of the couple. 4551 905 
AGEls Age of the head is between 65-69. .355 .479 
AGE2* Age of the head is between 70-74. .152 .360 
(Baseline is head is aged between 60-64.) 
55te(t)/LTW: Present value of future social security .464 .238 
benefits divided fay lifetiae wealth. 
PDVO : Present value of f-w-ttire earnings 1169 669 
frois the tiwe the head is aged fl Cage 60) 
to age T. 
SSK x Present value of future social security 4539 2667 
benefits froa the tiae the head is aged 
ft (age 60) to age T. 
NINTcR : Proportion of saaple net living in an .657 .475 
intergenerational household. 
SELF : Household head is «€lf-eaployed. .301 .459 
NCHIL ' Nuaber of Living Children. 2.603 1.524 
LARGS : Couple lives in a city of over 10Qf00C .585 .493 
CITY people. 
fccDIUM : Couple lives in a city of between 10»C00 .182 .386 
CITY and 100,000 people. 
Oaseline is couple lives in a rural area.) 
MORS THAN: Proportion of saaple with sore than one .818 .386 
ONE CHILD? child. 
OCHIL s Proportion of saiple with exactly one .105 .306 
child. 
(Baseline is no children.) 
Table 2 
Cohort Means of Selected Variables 
(in tens of thousands of 19B3 yen) 
Age Group 
60-64 65-6? 70-74 
NUMBER OF ' Total 165 119 51 
OBSERVATIONS Below High 78 65 29 
Hiqh School 5? 32 17 
College 28 22 5 
TOTAL WEALTH Average 3641 3904 42*2 
Below"High 3525 354? 5332 
High School 3103 3473 2858 
College 5096 5577 250-
FINANCIAL Average 934 924 1100 
WEALTH Below'High 750 664 910 
High School 946 848 712 
College 132? 1545 604 
REAL ESTATE Average 2722 3027 3427 
WEALTH Below High 2776 2885 4441 
High School 2156 2625 2147 
College 3768 4032 1900 
LIFETIME Average 4901 4341 3904 
WEALTH Below'High 4365 3891 3527 
High School 4934 4465 4290 
College 6283 5490 4778 
PRESENT VALUE Average 2466 2083 1801 
OF SOCIAL SEC, Below High 2236 1847 1463 
DEN, FROM AGE High 2688 2258 2341 
t TO AGE T College 2641 2526 1924 
PRESENT VALUE Average 4899 419? 4164 
OF SOCIAL SEC. Below High 4453 3706 355? 
BEN* FROM AGE High School 5355 4695 5250 
60 TO AGE T College 5180 4937 3977 
PRESENT VALUE Average 1273 1143 889 
'IF EARNINGS Below High 1185 1057 83? 
FROM AGE 60 High School 1132 1209 947 
TO AGE T College 1816 1301 987 
Table 3 
Dependent Variable: Total Wealth/Lifetiae Wealth 
111 C2) 
CONSTANT .581 .214 
(2.94) 11.171 
HEADf65-69 ,164 .148 
Ci.47) CI.31) 
HEADf70-74 .433 .369 
CI.49) CI.43) 
SOCIAL SEC. WEALTH/ .0117 .0447 
LIFETIME WEALTH C . 05 ) C.22) 
LARGE CITY .0319 .0332 
(.13) C.53) 
KEDIUfl CITY -.0419 .0132 
C-.22) C-.07) 
SELF EflPLOYHD .440 .336 
C2.33) C2.44) 
NUMBER OF .132 
LIVING CHILDREN CI.971 
R-squared: .044 .074 
8reusch-Pagan: 130.27 329.43 
Saiples 335 335 
Asyiptotic t-statistics in parentheses. 
Standard-errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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rises, W(t)/LTW shows no tendency to decline. The Japanese 
elderly do not seem to be dissaving. Also, a greater number 
of children raises wealth holdings as a share of lifetime 
wealth, suggesting the presence of a bequest motive. These 
conclusions are still tentative, however, since Eg. (1) is 
mis-specified when it is applied to the entire sample of the 
elderly. The elderly who live with a younger family do not 
have to reduce their assets in order to finance their old-age 
consumption. "Net wealth measurement bias" is present, since 
the younger family will support the elderly in return for 
receiving the bequest. 
To provide for the correct specification, Eq. (1) is 
estimated on only the sample of the independent elderly. 
Since the independent elderly finance their own consumption 
from their own wealth, the independent elderly*s observed 
wealth level is their true wealth level. However, because 
the sample of only the independent elderly is a self-selected 
sample, bias in the coefficient estimates may result unless 
this self-selection is accounted for in my estimation. 
Table 4 depicts the results from the joint maximum-
likelihood estimation of Eq. (1) with Eq. (2), the self-
selection equation. The first column shows the estimates of 
the self-selection equation.1 An increase in earnings after 
•^ It is well-known that with heteroskedastic errors, the 
coefficient estimates in a censoring model as that above will 
be inconsistent. Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981) and Nelson 
Table 4 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of trie £lderlyfs Choice of Independence 
and Their Age-Wealth Profile if Independent 
Elderly Couple «ge-Wealth Ratio Profile 
Remains for Independent Couples 
independent Selec. corr. Hetero. ccrr, 
{ 1) ( 2) (3) 
CONSTANT -.242 .261 .561 
(-.401 (.51) (1.68) 
HEA0f6 5-69 - — — .0565 .0822 
(.19) (.95) 
HEACf7Q-74 .506 .561 
(1.36) (1.1?) 
PRESENT VALUE OF .516 _--.--
EARNINGS AFTER 60 (2.19) 
(IfCCC) 
PRESENT VALUE OF -.132 
SOCIAL SEC- AFTER 60 (-.40) 
(10*000) 
SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH/ -.00617 -.C32C 
LIFETIME WEALTH (-.011) (-.107) 
LIFETIME WEALTH .170 — - — 
(IfCOO) (1.20) 
LARGE CITY .567 .107 -.0206 
(2.90) (.24) (-.070) 
MFDIUM CITY .297 -.210 -.254 
(1.24) (-.38) (-.84) 
SELF EMPLOYED -.973 .422 .489 
(-2.39) (2.56) (2.23) 
ONE CHILD -1.024 • 
(-2.52) 
MORE THAN -.723 -—•— • • 












age 60 raises the probability of independence. Both lifetime 
wealth and social security wealth after age 60 are 
insignificant, casting some doubt on the notion that living 
alone is a superior good for the aged in Japan. Kurz (1985) 
has argued that the decline in the number of three generation 
families in the United States since the Second World War was 
caused by the growth of the social security system. An 
increase in social security benefits meant that the elderly 
no longer had to rely on their children for support. Since 
living with children is assumed to be less desirable than 
living alone, more elderly people could afford to make the 
preferred choice. My evidence for Japan does not support 
Kurz's hypothesis. The further development of the social 
security system should not by itself cause the breakup of 
the Japanese three generation family. 
Table 4 shows that in large cities, the elderly are 
more likely to be independent. The tradition of taking care 
of parents may be weaker in urban areas. The high negative 
significance of the OCHIL variable suggests that the elderly 
are more likely to form an intergenerational household with 
children than with other younger relatives. In addition, the 
estimates do not support the presence of bargaining between 
(1981) through Monte Carlo techniques show that if the 
censoring is not severe (less than half the observations at 
the limit), the biases arising from heteroskedasticity are 
rather mild. Inferences must be made with caution, however, 
since the standard errors will still be biased. 
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the parents and children. The coefficient on OCHIL has a 
larger negative value than the coefficient on MCHIL.2 Given 
that the parents have at least one child, further increases 
in the number of children do not raise the probability of 
joining a younger family. 
The second column of Table 4 depicts the selectivity-
corrected estimates of the age-wealth relation. The 
coefficients on both age dummies are positive, but 
insignificant. A Wald test of the hypothesis that bi_ = c± 
has a Chi-sguared value of 1.18, significant at only the 27 
percent level, implying that among the different age 
classes, there are no significant differences in the total 
wealth levels. Also, in contradiction to the work of 
Kotlikoff (1979) and Hubbard (1986) who find substantial 
displacement of private wealth by social security wealth in 
U.S. cross-section data, the results in Table 4 suggest that 
social security does not displace private tangible wealth in 
Japan; the coefficient on social security wealth is 
insignificant. The last row between the first and the second 
columns gives RHO, the estimate of the correlation 
coefficient between the error terms in the selection equation 
and the age-wealth relation. The estimate of RHO is 
insignificant. We cannot reject the hypothesis that there 
2A likelihood ratio test, however, cannot show that the 
coefficient on OCHIL is significantly more negative than the 
coefficient on MCHIL. 
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will be no selection bias when Eq. (1) is estimated on only 
the sample of the independent elderly. The least-squares 
estimates of Eq. 1 on only the sample of the independent 
elderly are therefore consistent estimates of the population 
parameters of the age-wealth relation. 
The third column of Table 4 reports the results for 
least-squares without the need for selection correction. 
Heteroskedasticity, however, is present as shown by the 
Breusch-Pagan statistic of 496.63, and White's (1980) 
constant covariance estimator is used. The pattern of the 
coefficient estimates in the third column is close to that in 
the second column. There is again no evidence of dissaving 
with advanced age. 
How do the estimates of the age-wealth relation for the 
Japanese elderly compare with the estimates for the U.S. 
elderly? Most studies using cross-section data of the U.S. 
elderly have also found no evidence of dissaving (Mirer, 
1979, Menchik and David, 1983). The elderly in the U.S. seem 
to hold constant or even accumulate wealth as they age. The 
shape of the age-wealth profile of the U.S. elderly is 
probably similar to the shape of the age-wealth profile 
estimated here for the Japanese elderly. 
As mentioned in Section 2, the lack of dissaving by the 
elderly does not by itself prove the existence of the bequest 
motive. The elderly may be holding their wealth intact as a 
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precaution against unanticipated medical expenses or living 
an unexpectedly long life. To test for the bequest motive, 
Eq. (1) is re-estimated on the sample of the independent 
elderly with NCHIL added as an additional regressor, and the 
results are depicted in Table 5. The estimates in the second 
column of Table 5 are selectivity-corrected. Since the 
Breusch-Pagan Chi-squared statistic again rejects the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity, heteroskedasticity-
corrected least squares estimates are reported in the third 
column. We can see from the Table that the coefficient on 
NCHIL is highly significant. An increase in the number of 
children increases the total wealth-lifetime wealth ratio by 
.166. Multiplying the average lifetime wealth level of 4551 
by .166 gives 755. An increase of one child raises average 
wealth holdings of the independent elderly by 7.55 million 
yen. 
The effect of children on wealth holdings seems to 
differ between the United States and Japan. Blinder, Gordon, 
and Wise (1983) find that a greater number of children 
increases wealth holdings by only a small amount. The mean 
increase in wealth due to the bequest motive is calculated to 
be 1.25 times the annual consumption of the average 
household.3 Hurd (1987) using U.S. longitudinal data also 
3The mean increase in wealth holdings is calculated by 
(dWEALTH/dNCHIL)*(average NCHIL) where average NCHIL is the 
average number of children in the sample. 
Table 5 
Maxinum Likelihood Estiaates of the £lderlyfs Choice of Independence 
and the Effect of the huioer of Children if Independent 
Elderly Couple Effect of Number of Children 
Reaairs If Independent 
Independent Selec. Corr. Hetero. corr, 
(1) (2) C3) 
CONSTANT -.242 .112 .126 
(-.4C) (.161 (.55) 
HEAD, 65-69 • .C627 .C640 
(.23) (.70) 
HEQ1t?0-74 .479 .481 
(1.33) (1.16) 
PRESENT VALUE OF .512 — - — • — 
EARNINGS AFTER 60 (2.16) 
(If 000) 
PRESENT VALUE QF -.117 
SOCIAL S£C AFTER 60 (-.26) 
ClOfCOO) 
SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH/ -.0351 -.0365 
LIFETIME WEALTH (-.066) (-.13) 
LIFETIME WEALTH .16c — • 
(IfCCO) (1.17) 
LARGE CITY .56? .0656 .C591 
(2.97) (.15) (.25) 
MEDIUM CITY .295 -.206 -.203 
(1.25) (-.39) (-.80) 
SELF EMPLOYED -.979 .459 .462 
(-2.89) (1.62) (2.15) 
NUK3ER OF .166 .166 
LIVING CHILDREN (2.81) (2.57) 
ONE CHILD -1.0 24 • 
(-2.49) 
MORE THAN -.728 
ONE CHILD (-2.05) 






Saaple Size: 220/335 220 
Asyiptotic t-statisties in parentheses. 
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5. Conclusion 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the Japanese 
elderly are keeping their wealth intact. The elderly are not 
reducing their total wealth. Why are the elderly not 
dissaving? Section 4 finds that the bequest motive is 
important. The bequest motive increases the average Japanese 
elderly's wealth holdings by approximately 6 times the annual 
consumption of the average household. 
The result that the Japanese elderly are not dissaving 
is based on estimates of the age-wealth relation on a sample 
of the independent elderly, those who choose not to live with 
their children or other younger relatives. Tests of sample 
selectivity bias could not reject the null hypothesis that 
the age-wealth relationship estimated for the independent 
elderly represent the parameters for this relationship across 
the entire elderly population. Therefore, the age-wealth 
relation estimated on only the sample of the independent 
elderly is an unbiased estimate for the entire population of 
the elderly. 
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shows that the presence of children does not increase the 
elderly"s wealth holdings. For the Japanese elderly, the 
mean increase in wealth holdings is 6 years of annual 
household consumption.4 The bequest motive seems to be more 
important for the Japanese elderly. While the lack of 
dissaving for the U.S. elderly may be largely attributable to 
other motives, such as the precautionary motive, the lack of 
dissaving for the Japanese elderly is at least partly 
attributable to the desire to leave bequests. 
4The 6 years is calculated by multiplying the 7.55 
million yen predicted from Eq. (1) by the average number of 
children, 2.6, and then dividing by the average annual 198 3 
household consumption level. 
APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A-l 
Gross and Net of Tax Pre«=f1andantcry Retirement Lifetime yealths 
By Age and education 
(in tens of thousands of 1983 yen) 
Education Belo* High High School College 
Age 
60 Gross 3661 417c 5709 
Net 3364 3793 5012 
61 Gross 3547 4038 5518 
Net 3264 363C 4858 
62 Gross 3456 3928 5346 
Net 3137 3594 4731 
63 Gross 3398 384S 5204 
Net 3193 3526 4489 
64 Gross 3317 3756 5059 
Net 3C78 3454 4385 
65 Gross 3235 3659 4295 
Net 3C06 3365 4335 
66 Gross 3163 3539 4766 
Net 2945 3311 4261 
67 Gross 3C33 3493 4624 
Net 2873 3231 4146 
63 Gross 3C13 341C 4499 
Net 2819 3164 4048 
69 Gross 293C 3314 Ino one in category) 
Net 2745 3C34 
70 Gross 2838 3272 4319 
Net 2716 3059 3921 
71 Gross 2733 3139 4115 
Net 2620 2941 3744 
72 Gross 2714 2984 3997 
Net 2511 2879 3656 
73 Gross 265C 2934 (no one in category) 
Net 2511 2818 
Table A-2 
Probit Estimates cf the Probaoiiity of 
Eaployient After £ge 60 of the Household Head 
CONSTANT 9.C96 
(5.01) 
Abe Or HEAD -•1424 
f-5.IS) 
PcDIUfl CITY -.2196 
(-.76) 










SELF EMPLOYED 5. 86 
(.21) 






X-squared(7) = 196.46 
Asyiptotic t-stdtistics in parentheses. 
335 observations. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Ando, A. and A. Kennickell (1986). "How Much (or Little) Life-Cycle is 
There in Micro Data? Cases of U.S. and Japan." mimeo., University 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
Ando, A.(1985). The Savings of Japanese Households: A Micro Study Based 
on Data From the National Survey of Income and Expenditure, 1974 
and 1979. Manuscript. The University of Pennsylvania. 
Barro, R.J.(19 74). "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," The Journal of 
Political Economy, (82). 
Bernheim, B.D. (1984). "Dissaving After Retirement: Testing the Pure 
Life Cycle Hypothesis," presented at the NBER conference on 
Pensions and Retirement in the United States, April. 
Bernheim, B.D., Shleiffer, A., and Lawrence Summers (1985), "The 
Strategic Bequest Motive," The Journal of Political Economy, (94). 
Blinder, A. (1973). "Distribution Effects and the Aggregate Consumption 
Function," Journal of Political Economy, (83). 
Blinder, A, Roger Gordon, and Donald Wise (1983). "Social Security, 
Bequests, and the Life Cycle Theory of Saving: Cross-sectional 
Tests," in The Determinants of National Saving and Wealth, ed. 
Franco Modigliani and Richard Hemming. London: Macmillan. 
Borjas, G.J. and Jacob Mincer (1978). "The Distribution of Earnings 
Profiles in Longitudinal Data," in Income Distribution and Economic 
Inequality, ed. Zvi Griliches. New York: Halsted Press. 
Breusch and Pagan (1979). "A Simple Test for Heteroskedasticity and 
Random Coefficient Variation, Econometrica, (47). 
Davies, J.B. (1981). "Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption, and Dissaving in 
Retirement," Journal of Political Economy, (89). 
Diamond, P. and J, Hausman (1984). "individual Retirement and Savings 
Behavior," Journal of Public Economics, (23). 
Feldstein, M.S. (1985). "American Economic Policy and the World 
Economy," Foreign Affairs, (63). 
Feldstein, M.S.(1974). "Social Security, Induced Retirement and 
Aggregate Capital Accumulation." The Journal of Political Economy, 
(82). 
Fukutake, T. (1981). Japanese Society Today. Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press. 
Greene, W. (1981). "On the Asymptotic Bias of the Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimator of the Tobit Model." Econometrica, (49). 
Hashimoto, M. (1974). "Economics of Postwar Fertility in Japan: 
Differentials and Trends," Journal of Political Economy, (82). 
Hausman, J. (1978). "Specification Tests in Econometrics," Econometrica, 
(46). 
Hayashi , F. (1986). "Why is Japan's Saving Rate So Apparently High?" 
Paper presented to the NBER Conference on macroeconomics, March. 
Hayashi, F., Ito, T. , and Slemrod (1986). "Housing Finance 
Imperfections and National Saving: A Comparative Simulation 
Analyses of the U.S. and Japan," mimeo., University of Minnesota, 
Minneapolis. 
Heckman, J. and Thomas MacCurdy (1983). "Labor Econometrics," in 
Handbook of Econometrics, ed. Zvi Griliches and Michael D. 
Intriligator. New York: North Holland Publishing. 
Henderson, J.V. and Y.M. Ionnides (1983). "A Model of Housing Tenure 
Choice," American Economic Reviewj (73). 
Higuchi, Y.(1982). "The Labor-Supply of Married Women in Japan," (Gai-
kon Joshi no Rodo Kyokyu), 
Mita Shogaku Kenkyu (25). 
Horie, Y.(1985). "The Movement of the Household Saving Rate," Kinyu 
Kenkyu, (4) (in Japanese). 
Horioka, C. (1985). "Household Saving in Japan: The Importance of 
Target Saving for Education and Housing," unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge. 
Horioka, C.(1984). "The Applicability of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis of 
Saving to Japan," Kyoto University Economic Review, No.2. 
Hubbard, R.G. (1986). "Pansion Wealth and Individual Saving." Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking, (18). 
Hurd, M. (1986). "Saving and Bequests," NBER paper 1826, January. 
Hurd, M. (1987). "Savings of the Elderly and Desired Bequests," American 
Economic Review, (77). 
Ishida, T. (1971). Japanese Society. New York: Random House. 
Kanamori, H.(1961). "Why is the Saving Rate in Japan High?" Keizai 
Geppo, (October 30). 
Kennickell A. (1984). "An Investigation of Life-Cycle Saving Behavior 
in the United States," unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania. 
Killingsworth, M. (1981). "A Survey of Labor Supply Models: Theoretical 
Analyses and First-generation Results," Research in Labor 
Economics, (4). 
King, M.A. (1983). "The Economics of Saving," NBER Working Paper No. 
1247, December 1983. 
King, M.A. and L. Dicks-Mireaux (1982). "Asset Holdings and the Life-
Cycle," Economic Journal, (92). 
Kitayama, S. (1978). "The Wage Structure in the Pre- and Post-war 
Periods, (Senzen Sengo no Chingin Kozo)," Monthly Survey of Labor 
Statistics, (Rodo Tokei Geppo), in Japanese. 
Komiya, R. (1965). "The Supply of Personal Savings," in Ryutaro Komiya, 
e(^
-> Postwar Economic Growth in Japan, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Kotlikoff, L.J. (1979). "Testing the Theory of Social Security and Life-
Cycle Accumulation," American Economic Review, (69). 
Kotlikoff, L.J., and A. Spivak (1981). "The Family as an Incomplete 
Annuities Market," Journal of Political Economy, (89). 
Kotlikoff, L.J., and Lawrence Summers (1981). "The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation," 
Journal of Political Economy, (89). 
Kurz, M. (1985). "The Economics of Savings: A Comment," in Frontiers of 
Economics, ed. Kenneth Arro and Seppo Honkopohja. New York: 
Blackwell. 
Maddala, G.S. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in 
Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mariger, R. (1986). Consumption Behavior and the Effects of Government 
Fiscal Policies. .Cambridge: Harvard University. 
Marschak, T. A. (1986). "Organizational Design," in Handbook of 
Mathematical Economics, ed. Kenneth J. Arrow and Michael 
Intrilligator. New York: North Holland Publishing. 
Menchik, P. and Martin David (1983). "income Distribution, Lifetime 
Savings, and Bequests," American Economic Review, (73). 
Menchik, P. and Martin David (1985). "The Effect of Social Security on 
Lifetime Wealth Accumulation and Bequests," Econometrica (52). 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mirer, T. (1979). "The Wealth-Age Relation Among the Aged," American 
Economic Review (69). 
Mitsuyukij M. (1981) . The Modern Samurai Society: Duty and Dependence 
in Contemporary Japan. New York: Amacom. 
Mizoguchi, T. (1973). The Economics of Savings, (Chochiku no 
Keizaigaku), Tokyo: Keizai-shobo. 
Mizoguchi, T.(1970). Personal Saving and Consumption in Postwar Japan. 
(Tokyo: Kinokuniya). 
Modigliani, F. and R. Brumberg (1954). "Utility Analysis and the 
Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-section Data," in 
Post-Keynesian Economics, ed. Kenneth K. Kurihara. (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press). 
Nakayama, H. (1977). "Wage Levels in the Pre- and Post-war Periods, 
(Senzen Sengo no Chingin Suijun no Suii)," Monthly Survey of Labor 
Statistics, (Rodo Tokei Geppo)} in Japanese. 
Noguchi, Y.(1983). "Problems of Public Pensions in Japan." Hitotsubashi 
Journal of Economics, (24). 
Ogawa, N. and Andrew Mason (1986). "An Economic Analysis of Recent 
Fertility in Japan: An Application of the Butz-Ward Model., Jinko 
Gaku Kenkyu (9). 
Ohbuchi, H. (1982). "Empirical Tests of Ithe Chicago Model and the 
Easterlin Hypothesis: A Case Study of Japan." Jinko Gaku Kenkyu, 
(5). 
Patrick, H.T. and Henry Rosovsky (1976). "Japan's Economic Performance: 
An Overview," in Asia's New Giant, ed. Hugh T. Patrick and Henry 
Rosovsky. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Ranney, S.(1981). "The Future Price of Houses, Mortgage Market 
Conditions, and the Returns to Homeownership," American Economic 
Review, (71). 
Sato, K.(1982). "Japan's Savings and Internal and External Macroeconomic 
Balance," in Policy and Trade Issues of the Japanese Economy ed. 
Kozo Yamamura, (Seattle: University of Washington Press). 
Swartz, S., Danzinger, S., and E. Smolensky (1984). "The Choice of 
Living Arrangements by the Elderly," in Retirement and Economic 
Behavior, ed. Henry J. Aaron and Gary Burt less. Washington B.C.: 
Brookings Institution. 
Tachibanaki, T. and Keiko Shimono (1986). "Savings and the Life-Cycle: 
A Cohort Analysis," Journal of Public Economics, (31). 
Takayama, N. (1981). "The Redistributive Effects of the Social Security 
System," (Kosei Nenkin ni okeru Sedaikan no Saibunpai), Kikan 
Gendai Keizai, (Summer). 
Tomes, N. (1981). "The Family, Inheritance, and the Intergenerational 
Transmission of Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, (89). 
Ueda, K. (1985). "investment-Savings Balance and the Japanese Current 
Account," Discussion Paper No. 1, Institute of Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy, Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
Vogel, E. (1967). "Kinship Structure, Migration to the City, and 
Modernization," in Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan, ed. 
Ronald P. Dore. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
White, H.(1978). "A Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix and 
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, (46). 
STATISTICAL SOURCES 
Bank of Japan (1985), Basic Survey on Saving Attitudes (Chochiku ni 
Kansuru Yoron Chosa). Chochiku Zokyo Chuo Iin-kai. 
Department of Commerce (1986). Survey of Current Business, various 
monthly issues. 
Economic Planning Agency (1975). Wealth Survey of 1970. Tokyo: 
Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau. 
Economic Planning Agency (1986). Annual Report on National Accounts, 
1985. Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau. 
Economic Planning Agency, Living Bureau (1986). "Survey on Lifetime 
Planning," (Shogai Seikatsu Sekei ni Kansuru Chosa), January. 
Housing Loan Corporation. Report on the Survey of Housing Site Prices 
(Jutaku Shikichi Chosa), 1968-1982 editions. Tokyo: Jutaku Kinyu 
Koko. 
Japan Economics Times (Nihon-Keizai Shirnbun), various daily editions. 
Management and Coordination Agency (Prime Minister's Office), Statistics 
Bureau. National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure, (Zenkoku 
Shohi Jitai Chosa), various editions. 
Management and Coordination Agency (Prime Minister's Office), Statistics 
Bureau. Family Income and Expenditure Survey, (Kakei Chosa), 
various annual editions. 
Management and Coordination Agency (Prime Minister's Office). Statistics 
Bureau. Family Saving Survey, (Chochiku Doko Chosa), various 
annual editions. 
Ministry of Construction, Planning Bureau. Construction Statistics 
Yearbook, 1968-1982 editions. Tokyo: Zaidan Hojin Kensetsu Bukka 
Chosa-kai. 
Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau (1984), An Outline of Japanese Taxes. 
Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Printing Office. 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (1983). Actuarial Life Tables. Ministry 
of Health and Welfare Statistics and Information Department -
Ministry of Labor (1980) . Survey on Mandantory Retirement. (Teinen 
Taishoku ni Tsuite no Ishiki Chosa). Tokyo, Ministry of Finance 
Printing Office. 
Ministry of Labor. Basic Survey on the Wage Structure, (Chingin Kozo 
Kihon Chosa), various editions. 
